Swiss American Historical Society Review
Volume 58

Number 1

Article 2

2-2022

The Battle of Dornach 1499: A Contest Between Two Early
Tactical Infantries
Albert Winkler

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review
Part of the European History Commons, and the European Languages and Societies Commons

Recommended Citation
Winkler, Albert (2022) "The Battle of Dornach 1499: A Contest Between Two Early Tactical Infantries,"
Swiss American Historical Society Review: Vol. 58 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol58/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Swiss American Historical Society Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive.
For more information, please contact ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Winkler: The Battle of Dornach

Ruins of Dorneck Castle overlooking the Birs Valley.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

The Battle of Dornach 1499:
A Contest Between
		
Two Early Tactical Infantries
by Albert Winkler

In July of 1499, two well-trained tactical infantries fought

at the Battle of Dornach when the Swiss peasants and Swabian
mercenaries or Landsknechte met in a major engagement for the first
time. The Swiss infantry had been dominating battlefields in many
parts of Europe for decades, but the Battle of Dornach was a close
contest demonstrating that Swiss dominance might be over and a new
age of infantries was soon to begin. While tactical infantries had been
deployed on the field of battle for centuries, this was one of the few
times in the Middle Ages that two of them met head to head.
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The Swiss first developed the tactics that both they and the
Swabians would use in the Battle of Dornach. In a lengthy development
that took nearly two centuries to complete, the Swiss developed their
advanced infantry tactics. By the Burgundian War of 1474-77, the
Swiss had developed their mature military system usually deploying
for battle in three square battle formations called Haufen (heap, mass)
or pike squares. These squares were arranged close enough to support
each other but were also capable of independent maneuvers. Rows of
men on each side of the structure wielded pikes which were spears
roughly eighteen feet in length and were designed to thwart cavalry
attacks. In the center of the formation, the men carried halberds, a
pole five to eight feet in length with an ax blade for slashing, a spear
point for thrusting, and a hook for pulling cavalrymen off their mounts.
When gunpowder came into use, this formation also used men with
Harquebuses or early muskets to shoot at their enemies. The Swiss
used the pike square with great skill and discipline, and they often kept
this tight formation during challenging maneuvers including going up
steep slopes or even crossing rivers.
When engaging the enemy, the pikemen would strike first.
These troops often stood the length of one arm or about three feet apart,
so they could wield their weapons effectively. The space between the
men allowed the halberdiers to rush past the pikemen to engage the
enemy at close quarters using their shorter weapons. If the pike square
was surrounded by superior forces, it would stop advancing and then
turn its weapons outward in a formation called the Igel (hedgehog) to
meet attacks from all directions. Once formed, the hedgehog was never
penetrated by enemy forces in over 200 years of combat.1
For further information on the Swiss system, see Eugen fon Frauenholz,
Das Heerwesen der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft (München: Beck, 1936); Walter
Schaufelberger, Die alte Schweizer und sein Kreig: Studien zur Kreigführung
vornehmlich in 15. Jahrhundert (Zürich: Europa, 1952); Albert Sennhauser, Hauptmann
und Führung in Schweizerkrieg des Mittelalters (Zürich: Fretz und Wasmuth, 1965);
and Christian Patrutt, Staat und Krieg im alten Bünden (Zürich: Fretz und Wasmuth,
1965).
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Swiss vs the Landsknechte by Hans Holbein the Younger.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

The effectiveness of the Swiss military system was demonstrated in a spectacular fashion at the Battle of Murten in 1476.
In a victory which gained the attention of all of Europe, the Swiss
annihilated an army of Charles the Bold of Burgundy. This was a
sensation and meant that the Swiss formations and weaponry would be
copied in many lands, and infantries would eventually replace cavalry
as the most important segment of European armies. According to the
eminent German military historian, Hans Delbrück, the Swiss victory
at Murten started a military revolution making it the greatest turning
point in military tactics since the battle of Marathon in 490 BC.2
An early test of the Swiss system came in the Swabian War of
1499, when they met the Swabian Landsknechte using similar tactics
and formations. The war took place because the Habsburg Emperor
Maximilian I was attempting to unify the German Empire to meet
internal threats from discontented regions, as well as the external
2
Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen
Geschichte, 6 vols. (Berlin: Georg Stilke, 1923) 3: 619.
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threats of France on the west and the advancing Turks on the southeast.
Maximilian realized he must have an active, powerful army to resist
such internal and external threats and began to reorganize the Habsburg
army in the mid 1480s, and he hired Swiss mercenaries to teach the
Swabians how to fight using their methods. These forces soon showed
success on the battlefields of Europe, and they became eager to test
their abilities against their former teachers, whom they deeply hated
stemming from raids and petty intermittent warfare between the two
peoples over many generations.
Maximilian tried to enhance the unity of the German Empire
under his control by introducing a tax called the Common Penny to
acquire funds, and the use of the Imperial Supreme Court to control
judicial matters. The Swiss refused to recognize these reforms, and
when the court passed judgments unfavorable to them, the Swiss
became openly hostile. At that point, both sides began to prepare for
war by massing troops on their borders. In the cold winter months of
1499, the Swiss and Swabian troops faced each other across the Rhine
River in an uneasy peace, and they amused themselves by shouting
insults back and forth. At one point, the Landsknechte mocked the
Swiss by composing unchristian and offensive songs. The final affront
came when the German mercenaries offended the Swiss’s sexual
preferences. The Swabians displayed a cow and called to the Swiss to
come over and make love to the animal. The men then mooed like cows
and calves. The Swiss retaliated by staging a raid in which they burned
a house and a stall. At this point, the war began in earnest.3
The Swabian War was poorly planned by each antagonist, and
overall strategy consisted largely of border raids which involved the
destruction of villages and the seizure of booty. Only a handful of
major engagements took place which never involved the entire armies
of either side, and the conflict has been described as war for war’s sake.
For more on the Swabian War see, Albert Winkler, “The Swiss in the Swabian
War of 1499: An Analysis of the Swiss Military at the End of the Fifteenth Century,”
Swiss American Historical Society Review 56 (November, 2020) 3: 55-141.
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An estimated 200 villages were destroyed on both sides and 20,000
people were killed. The Habsburg forces constructed bastions in the
Alps east of the Swiss lands, from which the Austrians raided down
the Alpine valleys, plundering and burning. In the battles of Frastanz
and Calven, the Swiss and their allies marched up the valleys and over
nearby mountains in impressive feats of discipline and stamina to attack
the enemy positions. The Battle of Calven was a costly victory for the
Swiss, but they had removed important Habsburg bases of operation.
By July 1499, the war was going badly for the Empire. The
Swiss had been successful in defeating the Imperial forces in every
important engagement of the war, and the Empire’s operations in the
mountains of the Tirol and the Grey Leagues had floundered. But
Maximilian still had some reason for optimism. He had assembled large
armies around Constance and in the Sundgau Valley near Basel. Most
of the troops in those areas had not seen any major action, and many
were still eager to punish the Swiss and seek revenge for enemy raids.
Yet any significant operations would have to take place soon because
funds were nearly exhausted, the troops were complaining of a lack
of pay, and some were deserting to return home. A single key victory
could secure enough booty to keep the armies intact, and such a success
would doubtlessly strengthen Maximilian’s war effort and might even
convince the Swiss to come to favorable terms with the Empire.4
Maximilian’s plan was to make a demonstration in one area
to divert attention and then to stage a significant strike in the other
simultaneously. The largest Swiss force concentrations were around
Constance, watching the Empire’s troop movements very closely. A
large advance in that area would attract a good deal of attention, but a
demonstration of force from Constance should not risk battle because
Eugen Tatarinoff’s Die Beteiligung Solothurn am Schwabenkriege bis zur
Schlacht bei Dornach 22. July 1499 (Solothurn: A. Luety, 1899) presents an excellent
account of the Battle of Dornach. It also includes a large appendix of correspondence
between Solothurn and its military leaders. See also, “Gedenkschrift 500 Jahre
Schlacht bei Dornach 1499-1999,” Jahrbuch für Solothurnische Geschichte 72
(1999): 5-[392].
4
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Contemporary illustration of the Battle of Dornach 1499.
a defeat might break up or even destroy the imperial army. The main
attack would take place farther west, and Maximilian ordered Heinrich
von Fürstenberg to advance from the Sundgau to take the strategic
castle of Dorneck in the Birs Valley near Basel. Dorneck was a strategic
focal point for a large area of the Swiss Confederation. From there, an
army could march west to the Jura mountain passes, southwest to Bern,
south to Solothurn, or east to Olten, and from Olten, down the Aara
Valley to the Zurich area.5
5

Johann Lenz, Der Schwabenkrieg, (Zürich: Orell Fussli, 1849), 136.
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Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

In May and June 1499, Fürstenberg assembled his army in the
Sundgau of south Alsace. It numbered between 10,000 and 15,000 men,
but these troops varied much in quality. Many were simple conscripts
who had little interest in the campaign or its outcome. Others were
the superb Landsknechte from the Gelderland, numbering over 2,000
men who were very able and experienced German mercenaries. The
infantry was armed in a similar fashion as were the Swiss with long
pikes and other shorter weapons much like the halberd. The army had
many large artillery pieces for sieges and smaller cannons to be used
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2022
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against the enemy infantry in battle. The cavalry consisted of 1,100 of
the feared and respected Welsch Guard (French guard) from Burgundy.
These were heavily armored men and horses, who were very effective
in battle and known for running down their enemies. However, due
to lack of pay, these knights were poorly motivated and proved to be
largely ineffective in battle because they were more interested in taking
booty than in the conflict.6
Fürstenberg could have marched on Dorneck early in July and
met little resistance, but he decided to await the arrival of more horses,
thus allowing the Swiss more time to react to his threat and prepare a
better defense. Solothurn purchased the castle of Dorneck in 1490, and
the city recognized the strategic value of the fortress and manned the
position throughout the war. Benedikt Hugi led the small garrison of
slightly more than 20 men, and their commander was concerned about
his ability to protect the castle in case of attack. He wrote to Solothurn
frequently for more men and support. The city finally reacted on July
9, 1499, and sent masons to repair the castle and artillery pieces to
strengthen the fortress, but these preparations were unfinished when
the enemy army arrived.7
Solothurn sent its mayor, Niklaus Conrad, and 1,500 men to
Gempen, a village about four miles from Dorneck, to watch the area
and harass the imperial forces should they advance. A Swiss army
of 6,000 men was watching the enemy forces at Constance, but the
demonstration from that fortress was unimpressive, so Solothurn
was able to convince them that the greatest danger was at Dorneck.
When the Swiss facing Constance heard that Fürstenberg’s army was
6
“Anonyme Chronik des Schwabenkrieges” in Basler Chroniken, 7 vols.
(Leipzig: Hirzel, 1872-1915) 6: 11; Anshelm, Berner-Chronik, 2: 218; Tatarinoff,
Beteiligung, 166-7; and Reiter, “Schwabenkrieg,” 146.
7
Anton Haffner, Chronica (Solothurn: Zepfel, 1849), 58-9; Carl von Elgger,
Kriegswesen und Kriegskunst der Schweizerischen Eidgenossen in XIV., XV, und XVI
Jahrhundert (Lucerne: Militärisches Verlagsbureau, 1873), 388; Anshelm, Berner
Chronik, 2: 192; and Fritz Rieter, “Der Schwabenkrieg vor 450 Jahren,” Schweizer
Monatshefle 29 (June 1949): 145.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol58/iss1/2

8

Winkler: The Battle of Dornach

The Battle of Dornach 1499: A Contest Between Two Infantries

9

approaching the castle near Basel, most of them marched to Gempen
as rapidly as possible. For the first time in the war, Bern, angered by
Swabian raids, sent a large contingent of 3,000 men to help Solothurn.
On July 20, 1499, the Swiss contingents began to reach Gempen.8
The imperial army started to arrive near Dorneck early on July
22, 1499, and those troops began to prepare a siege according to all the
accepted practices of the age. The nearby villages, including Dornach,
had already been destroyed during a raid in March, so the armed forces
found little to plunder in the area. July 22 was St. Mary Magdalene’s
day, and the army took advantage of the holiday. The men played
games, danced, and sang in the fields between the villages of Dornach
and Arlesheim. Only the artillerymen were busy because they had to dig
into the ground to lay the largest siege cannons on the correct trajectory
to hit the castle while absorbing the recoil of the weapons at the same
time. Smaller artillery pieces were placed around the castle to shoot in
various directions in case of an enemy advance. Those devices were
also placed on the road between Dornach and Gempen to ward off any
possible Swiss attack by that route. This was the only real precaution
taken against the possibility of a surprise attack. Fürstenberg’s men
failed to place lookouts and to send scouts to reconnoiter the area. A
man from Basel came to warn the troops that Swiss forces were nearby,
but his timely caution was ignored.9
Niklaus Conrad could see the entire imperial army from the
Schartenfluh hill, and he believed that a surprise attack in sufficient
strength could be successful, but all available manpower would be
needed to be present to make such an effort. Additional Swiss forces
started to arrive in the morning, but they were tired, hungry, and wet
with sweat from their long marches. By the early afternoon, they
numbered over 5,000 excellent troops. Among them were 3,000
Bernese troops and another 400 from Zurich. The men from Solothurn
Valerius Anshelm, Die Berner-Chronik, 6 vols. (Bern: Wyss, 1886) 2: 218, 224-5.
Petterman Etterlin, Kronica von der loblichen Eidgnoschaft (Basel: Eckstein,
1752), 250.
8
9
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shared food and wine with these men, and they were given some time
to rest.10
The only groups that were still on the march were 600 men
from Luzern and 400 from Zug. The Swiss war council decided to go
into battle without these additional men because if the attack were long
delayed there would be little chance of concluding the battle before
nightfall, but they hoped that the expected contingents would arrive in
time to aid in the outcome of the battle. This time the Swiss advanced
in two pike squares, a vanguard (Vorhut) and a main formation
(Gewalthaufen), believing that the men from Luzern and Zug would
comprise the rear guard (Nachhut) when they arrived on the scene. To
avoid detection, the men marched through the forest instead of using
the road. These forces started their advance in the mid afternoon.11
The Swiss battle plan was complicated, but it could be successful
if total surprise was achieved. Niklaus Conrad was the commander of
the vanguard, comprised mostly of men from Solothurn. When this
formation advanced from the forest, it divided into two groups. The
smaller one turned to capture some small artillery pieces, while the
larger one, led by Conrad, went straight for the large siege cannons,
which they were successful in taking. Heinrich von Fürstenberg heard
the noise and came to see what was happing. He got too close to the
Swiss who dragged him from his horse and killed him. At the very
outset of the battle, the imperial army was deprived of its commander,
but much of his army continued the contest without him. Conrad’s
group pushed on westward right through the center of the Swabian
camp. These men were surprised, thrown into great confusion, and
many, including the Welsch Guard, fled across the Birs stream.
Conrad and his men had shown great initiative, but that
vanguard was too small to keep the imperial army long in confusion.
The Swabian Army began to form up into battle formations, and the
10
Hans Rudolf Kurz, Schweizerschlachten, (Bern: Francke, 1962), 169 and Lenz,
Schwabenkrieg, 152.
11
Tatarinoff, Beteiligung, 175.
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Welsch Guard returned to threaten Conrad’s forces. The Swiss vanguard
was soon hard pressed and was forced to fall back towards the forest.
This contingent was only spared from slaughter by the skillful use of
the pike and musket.12
The smaller part of the vanguard was able to take the enemy
cannons, but it soon met stiff resistance as well. These men had to
fight desperately to keep from being overwhelmed, but they took
heavy casualties in doing so. This group was saved from annihilation
when the Swiss main formation (Gewalthaufen) of 3,000 men from
Bern broke clear of the forest. The main force had advanced as rapidly
as possible, but the dense undergrowth had slowed its progress. By
the time it entered the field of battle, both sections of the vanguard
were in grave danger, and the Swabian mercenaries (Landsknechte),
were forming into a large pike square. The smaller Swiss groups in
the vanguard fell back to join the main formation, and these combined
forces then marched to meet the German infantry.13
At that point, the battle became one of German foot soldiers
against the Swiss infantry because the Swabian cavalry, and some
of the Welsch Guard, withdrew from the fight. Many of them were
raiding far away, and the four hundred remaining were more interested
in robbing the dead than in actually participating in battle. The artillery
was also no factor in the contest even after the Swabian cannoneers
returned to their weapons after being chased off the field. They were
unable to use their artillery pieces effectively because their larger
weapons were aimed high to hit Dorneck and they were unable to train
them on the enemy. The Swiss were also forced to leave their cannons
behind because they could not bring them through the dense forest to
the battlefield.
The German mercenaries and the Swiss fought it out on the
fields between Dornach and Arlesheim. The contest was costly and a
prominence on the field of battle became known as “Blood Hill.” For
12
13

Anshelm, Berner-Chronik, 2: 229.
Lenz, Schwabenkrieg, 152.
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hours the two armies fought, the outnumbered Swiss making up in
ferocity what they lacked in manpower. No doubt, each side engaged
by thrusting forward with their pikes, while the men with halberds
looked for any opening to rush forward and engage the enemy at
close quarters. The troops with muskets also fired into the ranks of the
opposition bringing noise, smoke, and casualties inflicted at a distance
to the battle. Both armies pushed back and forth against each other
as the fighting swayed over the fields. Whenever one force made an
advance into the other, there would be a rally by the opposition, and the
front would again become stable. There was little chance for maneuver
because any change in the disposition of the troops invited an attack by
the other side before the redeployment could be complete. Neither side
was able to break the other’s ranks successfully, the battle continued to
rage fiercely, and the men on both sides became increasingly exhausted.
The battle appeared to be a stalemate if nothing changed.14
As nightfall was approaching, the battle was finally decided
by the timely arrival of Swiss reinforcements from Luzern and Zug.
These troops entered the field of battle near Arlesheim, shouting and
blowing horns, as they rushed to join the Swiss main mass. With these
fresh reinforcements, the Swiss staged their final attack. The weight of
the advance of the reinvigorated Swiss was too much for the exhausted
German mercenaries to bear, and they broke and fled. When they had
stood in the ranks, the Landsknechte had been able to inflict as many
casualties as they had suffered, but their losses mounted rapidly when
they were in flight, because they could no longer protect themselves in
battle array. The Swiss, furious after their costly and difficult victory,
pursued their enemies as they attempted to flee across the Birs stream,
killing everyone of them when they could be apprehended. In the
ensuing darkness and confusion as night fell, the Swiss fell upon their
own men, killing each other. When all of the men in the imperial army
had fled across the Birs and night had fallen, further pursuit became
14

Rieter, “Schwabenkrieg,” 148, and Anshelm, Berner-Chronik, 2: 230.
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impossible. Then the exhausted Swiss laid down on their weapons
where they were and slept.15
The contest between the Swiss and the German mercenaries
was bitter, and experienced soldiers testified to the ferocity of the battle.
About 3,000 German mercenaries, largely in their flight at the end of
the contest, and 500 Swiss had been killed in the battle. The Swiss were
given proper burials, but their adversaries were left to rot. Imperial
emissaries sought to retrieve the bodies of the fallen noblemen, but the
Swiss replied that the nobles would have to remain on the field of battle
with the dead peasants. Only the body of Heinrich von Fürstenberg was
taken from the field to the church at Arlesheim.16
The Swiss showed a great deal of concern for their wounded
and for the families of the dead. The wounded were taken to nearby
towns where they were cared for until they had fully recuperated. By
common consent of the troops, all the booty taken in the battle was
divided among the wounded and the widows and orphans of the dead.17
After the battle, the Swiss had an excellent opportunity to
march into Alsace or the Swabian lands, but the army showed no
interest in such advances. They remained for six days on the battlefield
and then returned home. Skirmishes took place in the area for days, but
the fighting soon died down. When Maximilian heard the news of the
Swiss victory, he ceased his military activities, which had become little
more than an artillery exchange between armies around Constance.18
The Empire’s war effort nearly collapsed because continued fighting
was considered to be fruitless, and military activity dropped off until
early in August, when there was hardly any fighting at all. On September
22, 1499, the protagonists signed the Peace of Basel. According to the
agreement, Maximilian recognized no further authority to tax or to put
Heinrich Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2 vols. (Basel: Basler Buch- und
Antquariatshandlung, 1910) 2: 451.
16
“Hauptleute etc. der Stadt Bern im Feld an Bern,” July 24, 1499 in Aktenstücke
zur Geschichte des Schwabenkrieges, 389-90 and Tatarinoff, Beteiligung, 183.
17
Elgger, Kriegswesen, 172-3.
18
Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, 2: 455.
15
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courts over the Swiss states. But much had changed because of the
Battle of Dornach. The Swiss would soon lose their dominance, and the
German mercenaries were on the ascendency.
					~ Utah Valley University
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